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PREFACE
I would like to begin by thanking all of those – an impressive number of people for a paperwith only one author -- who helped me both start and finish my undergraduate thesis. Firstoff,  I would like to thank committee members Edouard Machery,  and Kevin Zollman fortheir invaluable suggestions. Further thanks goes out to my friend and peer Josh Hunt, andneighbor  and  occasional  research  mentor  Dr.  Debra  Mariano  for  similarly  valuablecomments.  I  would  like  to  especially  thank  committee  member  Jeffrey  Schwartz  andcommittee  member  and  research  adviser  Sandra  Mitchell  who  in  their  many  roles  asprofessor,  advisor,  mentor,  and  exemplar  had  a  transformative  effect  on  not  only  thispaper, but also my entire undergraduate experience. Dr. Mitchell’s ability to be endlesslybombarded with doomed arguments by an over-enthusiastic  undergrad and yet  remainhelpful and encouraging all the way to the completed thesis says more about her than anylist of adjectives I could fit in this preface.Before beginning the thesis proper, I would like to make a few clarifications. As areader helpfully pointed out to me, “adaptive explanation” is casually thrown around in thephilosophy of biology, but it is actually quite a laden word. To head off any confusion, whenI say adaptive explanation I am referring to the explanation of the current existence of abiological trait by appeal to the historical effect of natural selection on the genotypes of a
vi
population. This will be discussed in much more detail, but it may be helpful to start withsuch a  platform.  However,  this  entails  that  those  who  challenge  either  the  viability  orexplanatory power of  natural  selection may object  to the meaningfulness of this  paper,even if they acknowledge the argumentation. This paper is not for them. Rather, if this werenot  a  mere undergraduate  thesis  fated to  obscurity,  I  would  hope to engage  with  twodistinct groups. For scientists, this paper could serve as a somewhat casual overview, withthe interesting feature that it exposes the supporting philosophical skeleton of practicesthey  are  likely  quite  familiar  with  in  the  flesh.  For  philosophers,  who  are  a  bit  moreagnostic on the topic, I have tried to toe the line between preserving their reservations, anddefending what I find to be an interesting and fruitful area of biology.
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INTRODUCTION
Adaptive explanation refers to the explanation of a trait by appeal to the putative forces ofselection that made it, e.g. the antlers of elk evolved in response to the selection pressure ofmale-male  competition  for  mates.   In  the  1930s,  with  the  advent  of  ethology  –  theevolutionary study of behavior – the use of adaptive explanations was broadened frommorphological to behavioral traits.1 Despite their current broad use across the evolutionarybehavioral  sciences,  they  remain  controversial,  particularly  when  applied  to  humanbehaviors.   Here,  I  aim  to  provide  clarification  and  measured  defense.  This  paper  isstructured as series of objections to the adaptive explanation of behavior, concerning: (1)whether  behavior  is  an  appropriate  object  for  science  at  all,  (2)  whether  the  use  offunctional accounts generally and adaptive accounts specifically is an appropriate way toexplain behavior, (3) whether the model-based approach is an appropriate methodology toarrive  at  adaptive  explanations,  and (4)  whether  human behaviors  are  an  appropriatetarget for adaptive explanations. With each objection, I characterize the kind of challenge it
1 This is not to say that evolutionary explanations were not applied to behaviors before the 1930s; see, for instance, Darwin’s exposition on birdsong in the Descent of Man (1871, pp. 48-65). Darwin also applies adaptive explanations to human behaviors in the Descent of 
Man (1871) and the Expression of Emotion in Man & Animals (1872). However, it is the work of Konrad Lorenz and Nico Tinbergen in the 1930s that is seen as providing a formalized and structured evolutionary science of behavior. Prior to them, by and large, behavior was ignored in the face of anatomical and morphological features, studied in fabricated laboratory settings using a psychological framework, or studied by amateur naturalists (Burkhardt, 2005; Lorenz, 1982). Lorenz and Tinbergen facilitated both a formal methodology and the explicit incorporation of evolutionary theory (see Tinbergen, 1963 and Lorenz, 1982 for discussion).
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represents  and  the  way  the  behavioral  sciences  have  responded.   (3)  and  (4)  areparticularly contentious, and therefore will form the bulk of my analysis.
1.0     BEHAVIOR AS A SCIENTIFIC OBJECT
I begin by briefly sketching one kind of appropriate scientific object. I then discuss behaviorwith respect to this account, identifying both its unproblematic and problematic features. Iconclude  by  defending  the  methodological  strategies  embraced  by  the  evolutionarybehavioral  sciences  as  responsive  to  these  challenges,  and  commensurately  holdingbehavior to be an appropriate scientific object.
1.1       APPROPRIATE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE
Obviously a full theory of what it takes to be an appropriate object for scientific study iswell beyond the scope of this (and perhaps any) paper.  Therefore, rather than trying todelimit a conceptual space that is occupied by appropriate objects of science and evaluatingwhether or not behavior fits within that space, I will instead begin with an uncontroversialobject of science, and see if behavior shares the features that seem to make that object soscientifically unproblematic. In short, my approach is expansive rather than constrictive. Let us begin by looking to two systems: (1) a ball being rolled down a hill, and (2) agazelle being approached by a lion. Before proceeding further, it is worth clarifying why thesecond  system constitutes  a  behaving  system.  The  most  obvious  difference  is  that  the
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second  system  is  living  or  biological  –  ethologists  do  not  see  non-living  systems  asbehaving. However, this is insufficient, after all, excepting the shape, a gazelle being rolleddown a hill could be analyzed in the same way as the ball, but one would not consider thatthe behavior  of  a  gazelle.  To be  behavior,  the  gazelle’s  actions  must  also  be internallymediated, e.g. by neurotransmission, chemical signaling, or muscular activation, as opposedto  merely  the  replication  of  interactions  that  occur  in  non-biological  systems  (such asgravitational acceleration) in systems that are incidentally biological.Now lets  us  compare the  systems specifically  with  respect  to  being  appropriateobjects of science. Both systems are physical and observable (i.e. they make no appeals toundetectable or supernatural forces).   However, the ball-hill  system is also (fairly) non-contingent,  accessible  to  experiment,  predictable,  and  able  to  be  specified  with  theprecision needed for scientific study (individuated). The ball-hill  system operates with the law-like regularity of physics.  An identicalsystem can be recreated simply by putting the ball  back on top of  the hill.  I  can easilychange just one thing involved in the system, e.g. the coefficient of friction, and see a directand isolatable change in outcome. If I cover the hill  in glue and observe the ball rollingmore slowly, I do not have to worry about the possibility that maybe the ball was simplyrolling more slowly because I was standing too close and making it skittish.  And in fact,given the current knowledge of physics, I can predict the results of almost any change Imake on the system, from changing the coefficient of friction to increasing gravity. Finally,the system is easily specified and precisely measurable, starting and stopping under exactparameters. I can describe my setup, e.g. I put a 5kg bowling ball on top of a 30-degreegrass-covered hill 3 meters in height, and scientists can then observe an identical system.While balls on hills may not be the most exciting, they are extremely cooperative.
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A gazelle being approached by a lion is not so tractable. If the gazelle sees the lion itmay run, but it may not see the lion, or it may jump in the air (stot) first – this makes thesystem both more contingent and less predictable.  Nor can I intervene on the system bychanging many things.  Finally, the gazelle’s actions exist as a stream of information. Sure, itmay run from the lion, but then it eats some grass, and then it licks itself, etc., until it dies.Which stretch of  actions should I  describe such that  a  scientist  will  be able to identify(approximately)  the  same  stretch  in  another  gazelle?  And  how  should  I  describe  orquantify them?Given  this  apparent  divergence  from  the  ball-hill  system,  there  are  two  broadstrategies. First, one could study behavior in a way that makes it as much like the ball-hillsystem  (i.e.  physics)  as  possible.  Second,  one  could  defend  a  particular  approach  tobehavior  that,  while  relevantly  different  from  that  used  by  physicists,  nonetheless  isscientific.2 The first strategy is certainly possible. Scientists could approach the actions of thegazelle  as  applied physiology:  this  brain  region  was activated,  these  neurotransmitterswere  released,  these  muscles  twitched,  etc.  In  fact  many  scientists,  e.g.  physiologists,neurologists,  look  to  exactly  these  factors.  However,  to  accept  only  this  strategy  isproblematic.   It  does  not  address  the  fact  that  behaviors  seem  to  do  something  fororganisms,  a  sort  of  apparent goal-directedness,  which is  a  particularly interesting andsalient feature of behavior.  Moreover, it is this feature of behavior that the evolutionarybehavioral sciences and adaptive explanations utilize, e.g. Melo et. al. (2011) who discuss
2 See Mitchell, 2009 for a discussion of why the physics-based approach is seen as paradigmatic, and a wide-ranging philosophical defense of the second strategy. I defend it here in a far more limited sense.
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wasps stinging spiders in order to lay their eggs in the them, rather than appealing to themechanism of the sting.In light of this, I will undertake a defense of the second strategy. Particularly, I willargue that behavior exhibits the same features that make the ball-hill system a good objectof science, but either exhibits them to a different (but still sufficient) degree, or exhibitsthem in a different manner.
1.2      BEHAVIOR ON ITS OWN TERMS
I  will  structure  this  defense  of  a  behavior  level  science  based  on  the  features  of  anappropriate  scientific  object  described above:  non-contingent,  accessible to  experiment,predictable, and able to be specified with the precision needed for scientific study (able tobe clearly individuated).  In the second section I will go into functional approaches in moredetail;  however,  it is important to my defense here that behaviors can be thought of asdoing certain things or performing certain functions for organisms.3A brief clarification before proceeding. Philosophers of science have recently arguedagainst  a  unitary  understanding  of  behavior,  defending  that  the  goals  towards  which
3 This statement seems to commit to a Cummins (1975) or causal role understanding of function. In causal role accounts, a function is understood as the role a function plays in the capacity of a containing system. For instance, the function of the concavity of a bowl is to give the bowl the capacity to hold liquids. For those familiar with the literature, this will seem an unusual starting point, as this paper is moving towards adaptive explanations which are historical and therefore prima facie better captured by an etiological understanding of function (see Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1984). However, the reason I begin with such an understanding of function is that much work in the evolutionary behavioral sciences appeals to function, but is ahistorical. Take Caro’s work on stotting in Gazelles (1986a, 1986b). It is a short-term study, and he uses no historical investigation strategies but nonetheless aims at functional attribution. I hope to address any tension my methodology evokes in the second section.
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research  is  directed  influence  the  framework  used  to  approach  and  explore  behaviors(Longino, 2013; Weber, 2012). For instance, reflex action may be considered a behavior ofinterest  by  a  neurologist  studying  motor  neurons,  but  not  by  a  behavioral  ecologiststudying interaction between behavior and ecology. With this critique in mind, I seek todefend behavior specifically as understood by the ethological tradition or the evolutionarybehavioral sciences  (including ethology,  behavioral  ecology,  human behavioral ecology,and evolutionary psychology) – the research tradition that most makes use of  adaptiveexplanations.  
1.2.1 Behavior as contingent
Like other biological features, the existence of a behavior is contingent upon evolutionaryhistory, development, and experience. Moreover, whether or not a behavior is performed iscontingent, dependent upon both internal factors and environmental conditions.  Finally,even when performed, the manner of expression is contingent, likewise dependent uponboth environmental factors (particular environmental demands) and internal factors. Allthis  adds  up  to  meaning  that  simply  observing  a  behavior  does  not  mean  it  occurspredictably or is easily generalizable. To get more traction on this problem, let us imagine that behaviors, instead, operatein a more lawful manner. Upon a lion getting within a certain distance of a gazelle, thegazelle  will  begin  to  move  away  and  the  lion  will  pursue.  This  happens  regardless  ofwhether the lion is spotted, the gazelle is hungry, or an experimenter is present – this issimply how gazelles and lions interact in this universe. Scientists can derive the behavior ofnew a gazelle from this law-like interaction. If  something unusual happens,  e.g. the lion
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turns away, scientists  can look at this  with respect to the lion-gazelle law to identify acause,  e.g.  a Wildebeest  intervened. Unfortunately,  evolutionary behavioral  scientists donot have it so good. There is the possibility of a superficially similar situation being verydifferent, e.g. gazelle A running from approaching lion A, but gazelle B not running fromapproaching  lion  B.  Moreover,  there  may  be  no  easy  way to  identify  the  cause  of  thedifference – maybe gazelle B did not see the lion, or maybe it had a small stroke. However, simply the fact that the evolutionary behavioral sciences deal with thesecontingent objects is not grounds for dismissal – every science must do so to some extentor the other (see Mitchell, 2009).  Two specific questions come to the forefront. First, arebehaviors  necessarily  so  contingent  that  they  can  never  be  approached  scientifically?Second, if not, can one evaluate the extent to which a behavior is contingent?The answer to this first question seems to be a definite no.  This would entail thatevery behavior is a sort of miracle contingent upon situations so elaborate that they arenever relevantly repeated. Certainly some behaviors may fit this. A starling, a bird noted forits abilities of mimicry, may somehow end up copying a once in a lifetime performance byYo-Yo  Ma.  This  would  seem  to  tell  us  little  about  the  normal  behavior  of  starlings.4However,  most  animals  definitely  perform  what  prima  facie  appears  to  be  the  samebehavior a sufficient number of times – look to stotting in gazelles,  collecting acorns insquirrels, wasps stinging spiders, etc.In  terms  of  evaluating  the  contingency  of  behaviors  (i.e.  the  obscurity  of  thecombination  of  causes  upon  which  behaviors  are  dependent),  evolutionary  behavioralscientists  have  at  least  three  strategies  available  to  them:  fixed-action  patterns,4 To clarify, this would tell us little about the behaviors of starlings; however, it would tell us a great deal about the capacity of Starlings.  Similarly, even a single instance of tool use or manufacture could be very powerful, even though the information it provides is not about the behavior of a species per se. 
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comparative methodology, and modeling.  A fixed action pattern -- easily recognizable andoften repeated complexes of  actions – picks out a specific  behavior from the stream ofinformation that behavior represents (Hinde, 1982, also see Tinbergen, 1942). After havingidentified such a behavioral unit, a scientist can simply look for it and empirically evaluatehow contingent (and ideally also upon what) a behavior is. Comparative analysis helps toidentify the relevant factors that are causing something by identifying the commonalitiesacross  situations  in  which  a  variety  of  causes  are  at  work,  i.e.  natural  experiments.Behaviors are susceptible to this approach, and looking at behaviors across environmentsand species (or even across many member of the same species) can lead to meaningfulinferences about the contingency of behaviors.  Finding similar behaviors across a widevariety of taxa and environments e.g. mobbing, or mating dances, provides evidence theyare contingent upon a less obscure set of causes.5 In contrast, behaviors found only in asmall number of members of one species are likely to be extremely contingent. A thirdoption discussed by Trestman (2011) is hypothetical models of behavior to which naturalbehaving  systems  can  be  matched.  For  example,  given  an  understanding  of  optimalforaging behavior,  one can model how long shorebirds will search for food in a specificpatch and when they will move to a new one – which can then be matched to the birdsactual behavior demonstrating a functional character to the bird’s behavior (van Gils et. al2003).  I  will  return to this  modeling based approach in much more detail  in  the thirdsection.  
5 See Trestman (2011) for a much more thorough analysis of the comparative or “Lorenzian” approach, albeit the context for his analysis is somewhat different than the “dealing with contingency” problem I am tackling here. Also see Neander & Rosenberg (2013), who provide an excellent look at the role of phylogenetic investigation in the analysis of functions – although their account of function is explicitly historical.
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1.2.2 Accessible to experiment
Behaving  systems  are  simply  not  manipulatable  to  the  degree  of  balls  on  hills.   Thebiological  nature  of  the  components  makes  everything  messier,  and  it  is  very  hard  tointervene on specific components. However, again, this is far from a death sentence. First,behaving systems can still be experimented upon. Second, there are other ways to get thesame kind of information that would be provided by experiments (or other relevant kindsof information).In  addition  to  simply  observing,  evolutionary  behavioral  scientists  do engage  inexperiments. Performing experiments involves toeing a very difficult line, as those in theethological  tradition  would  like  to  control  as  many  causal  factors  as  possible,  but  notcontrol  so  many  factors  that  behaviors  performed  are  not  representative  of  how  theorganism  performs  in  its  natural  environment  (see  Lorenz,  1982,  pp.  47-52,  64).  Thisdifficulty can be somewhat overcome through possessing a broad understanding of  theorganism and the behaviors it performs (ibid. pp.52-53). On this background of a generalknowledge  of  the  organism,  if  experimental  intervention  leads  to  aberration,  theexperimenter  is  far  more  likely  to  identify  it.  Alternatively,  experiments  can  also  beperformed in the wild.  To assess whether the mane of lions impacted mating, West put oneof two dummy (plush) lions that differed only in mane length by a female lion  (2005). Hecan  evaluate  whether  this  experiment  is  useful  by  looking  to  both  whether  behaviorinduced by one dummy differs with respect to behavior induced by the other, and whetherbehavior  induced  by  the  dummies  differs  qualitatively  from  behavior  that  occurs  inresponse to real male lions.
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It  is  also  well  established  that  scientists  use  non-experimental  approaches.Scientists in the ethological tradition have a rich observational literature that highlightsmany  correlations  between  ecology  (or  situation)  and  behavior.  And  again,  thecomparative and model-based approaches do work here. The comparative method sets upa sort of natural experiment, in which one can attempt to identify relevant causal factors bylooking at an array of different situations. In Shear’s research on web-building in spiders,he looks at a connection between particular features of the environment and the structureof the web being built (1994). The finding that there is a correlation between web designand ecology independent of  the species of  spider making the  web evidences that  web-design is a reaction to the environment.
1.2.3 Predictable
The  complexity  and large  number  of  unknown factors,  e.g.  physiological  condition,  lifehistory, etc., operating in behaving systems injects a certain sense of unpredictability, andmake them difficult to deal with in a causal-mechanical sense. To predict what a gazelle willdo when confronted by a lion purely by monitoring its  physiology would be extremelycomplicated.  However,  predictability  can  be  regained  through  the  application  of  anintentional or functional approach (see especially Dennett, 1989). As Weber illustrates, ifwe assume that the gazelle has intent, and it spots a lion sneaking up on it, it should want topreserve its life and run, and moreover, as a matter of prediction, the gazelle will likely dojust that (2012). Weber refers to this as the predictive value of the intentional stance, andrecasts this in functional terms through the idea that the behaviors of an organism should
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all  cohere towards (functioning to)  increasing  self-reproduction,  for similar approachesalso see Griffith, 2009 and Trestman, 2010.
1.2.4 Able to be individuated
Unlike other physical systems, behavior represents a continuous stream of information andtherefore  must be able  to be individuated into  usable  units  (see  Hinde,  1982).   Nanay(2010) preliminarily identifies three major ways to individuate biological traits: function,morphology, and homology. I look to them in turn.For  behaviors,  function  seems  to  be  the  most  powerful  as  it  allows  for  bothspecificity and generalizability. Let us take a specific behaving system, say a zebra. I can askwhich behavior functions to evade predators and arrive at the answer of running.  Thisboth  picks  out  a  particular  action,  and  differentiates  running  that  functions  to  evadepredators from other instances of running.6 Now take a skunk. I can ask the same question– which behavior functions to evade predators – and arrive at another distinct trait for theskunk: spraying.  “Predator evasion” serves as a general category that can be used to pickout specific behaviors in any behaving system that is threatened by predation. Morphology can be used to individuate behavior in two senses. First, a behavior cancorrespond to underlying cognitive and neurological  architecture.  Second,  and in a lessreductive  sense,  behaviors  can  be  more  or  less  like  morphological  features.   Somebehaviors, while individuatable, are extremely plastic and contingent. Take for instance theuse of spears to hunt in particular populations of Chimpanzees (Pruetz & Bertaloni, 2007).
6 The relationship between functional accounts and trait (or token) individuation is far more complicated than I am able to discuss here. I refer the reader to Nanay, 2010; Neander & Rosenberg, 2013; Trestman, 2011; and Weber, 2012 for a more focused look. 
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Other behaviors, such as the stinging of scorpions, are an extremely stable and invariablecomplex  of  actions.  These  invariable  behaviors,  as  captured  by  fixed  action  patterns,individuate behavior in the same way as morphology. They provide a stable and specificstructural description.As far as I am aware, homology does not serve to individuate behaviors, but I leaveopen the possibility.7  
1.3 SUMMARY
Behavior, and more specifically behavior as understood by the ethological tradition, doesindeed possess features that  make it  more difficult  to approach scientifically.  However,there  is  nothing  about  behavior  that  renders  it  scientifically  intractable.  I  specificallyargued that behavior is naturalistic and observable, and, with the right approaches, alsomanageably contingent, accessible to experiment, predictable, and able to be specified withthe precision needed for scientific study (individuated).
7 Although, I am uncertain as to how homology can serve to individuate at all. Homology is nothing more than similarity combined with a theory of relatedness. Even if one had very good reason to believe two organisms were phylogenetically related, they would not identify two organs as homologous without some morphological (including genetic or developmental) correspondence. In short, the individuation work of homology seems to be done morphologically. However, I do not yet have enough confidence in this argument to deny the possibility that homology may be used for individuation.
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2.0 EXPLAINING BEHAVIORS IN THE EVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
I  have  defended that  the  targets  of  adaptive  explanation,  i.e.  behavior,  are appropriatetargets of  scientific inquiry.  I  will  now address whether the techniques used to explainbehaviors are appropriate. I do so in three levels, addressing first “functional analysis,” next“selected-for  explanation,”  and  lastly  “adaptive  explanation.”  While  functional  analysisidentifies  the  role  a  behavior  plays  in  its  containing  system,  selected-for  explanationscorrespond  to  the  selective  (evolutionary)  history  of  trait,  and  adaptive  explanationslikewise  appeal  to  selective  history,  but  specifically  for  genetically  mediated  naturalselection. I conclude with a discussion on how scientists can move from functional analysisto  adaptive  explanation.  To  frame  this  section,  I  begin  with  an  overview  of  functionalaccounts within biology generally, and the evolutionary behavioral sciences specifically.
2.1     OVERVIEW
There are two main understandings of function within the philosophy of science. First isWright’s  (1973)  etiological  account,  of  which  more  biologically  specific  framings  areprovided  by  Millikan  (1984,  1989b),  Mitchell  (1989),  and  Neander  (1991).  Second  is
13
Cummin’s causal-role account, which is elucidated in a more biologically relevant way byWeber (2012) (also see Bigelow & Pargetter 1987).8 Etiological accounts of function aim to explain why a feature (or trait) is there byappeal  to the  causal  process  that  gave rise to  that  feature.  A  bowl  has  the  function ofholding because of design. In biological systems, an etiological account will explicitly appealto the evolutionary history of a trait. For instance, the function of eyelashes would be tokeep particulate out of the eye, if (1) there was selection for the capacity to keep particulateout of the eye, and (2) eyelashes arose and are reproduced because of this selection process(see Mitchell 1993). I will refer to this narrower use of the etiological account as a selected-
for function.
8 Another account of function has been recently introduced by Nanay (2010, also see 2013).  His account is quite elaborate and is allegedly differentiated from existing accounts by (1) modal force (how “would” a function contribute), (2) a focus on trait tokens rather than trait types, and (3) the use of counterfactuals. He is mistaken about (1) as causal-role can be interpreted as a disposition or propensity to contribute to capacity of a containing system if certain conditions would be met, (Nanay incorrectly identifies dispositional as strictly “future” accounts. Also see Kiritani, 2011 for a defense of modal force in etiological accounts), but this is beside the point.What matters here is, if Nanay were to be correct, would it change my project. The answer seems to be no. Nanay explicitly identifies his account with usefulness – which maps onto the causal-role a trait plays in the capacity of a containing system. Nanay prevents usefulness from collapsing into use through the use of modal force, which is exactly what disposition does for the causal role account. Finally, Nanay prevents his account from simply picking out every way a trait could be useful by contextualizing it with respect to the explanatory project. For instance, one could look to how a trait is useful for increasing survival and reproduction. Causal-role accounts make this same move by specifying the capacity that functions are contributing to, e.g. contributes to the capacity to survive and reproduce. His machinery for identifying function is a little different, but it identifies the same functions as the Cummins-style causal-role account.  Or, to put it another way, Nanay’s account functions identically to the causal-role account. Therefore I will simply speak of the more established causal-role account with the addendum that what I say about it also applies with Nanay’s account.  Given this symmetry with the causal-role, it is interesting that Nanay puts forth his account largely as a challenge to the etiological account, which as we will see, aims for a completely different kind of explanation (see Godfrey-Smith 1993; Millikan, 1989a; Mitchell, 1993).
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Causal-role accounts of function aim to explain function through the contribution afeature makes to the capacity of a containing system. Eyelashes would have the function ofkeeping particulate out of the eye, if  possessing eyelashes contributed to an organism’scapacity to keep particulate out of its eyes. This can be put in more evolutionarily relevantterms by connecting the function of a feature to an organism’s inclusive fitness (again seeBigelow & Pargetter, 1987; Weber 2012).  For instance, eyelashes have the function to keepparticulate out of the eye, if possessing eyelashes contributed to an organism’s capacity tokeep particulate  out of  its  eyes,  and if  the capacity to keep particulate  out of  the  eyescontributes  to  an  organism’s  inclusive  fitness.  Following  Weber,  I  will  refer  to  thisnarrower understanding of causal-role function as biological function. Significantly, causal-role accounts are time-slice or snap shot evaluations rather than causal-historical, as theycan represent the biologically functionality a behavior has with respect to a specific set ofenvironmental conditions, either past or present.9As should be clear, these two accounts of function, while often overlapping, havedifferent  explanatory  projects  (also  see  Godfrey-Smith  1993;  Millikan,  1989a;  Mitchell,1993).  Moreover,  these  accounts  are  appropriate  for  the  explanatory  interests  of  theevolutionary behavioral sciences. Those in the ethological tradition are interested in what atrait does for an organism within its current environment, e.g. how does making a suddenvertical  jump  before  fleeing  predators  increase  the  survival  of  gazelles  (Caro,  1986a,1986b), and therefore must rely on causal-role accounts. Tinbergen refers to this as thestudy  of  survival (1963,  also  see  Griffiths  2009).  However,  evolutionary  behavioralscientists are also interested in why a behavior exists in light of its selective history. Shear’s9 Causal-role accounts are often understood as picking out current function. This is true, but it is true by virtue of them being time-slice and able to pick out function at any specific moment in time. Griffiths makes this clear by discussing the etiological account of function as representing a series of causal-role accounts (1993).
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work on the convergent evolution of similar web-design for similar ecologies in spiders isillustrative (1994). This requires the use of etiological accounts (selected-for function), andis discussed by Tinbergen as the study of evolution (1963; Griffiths, 2009).
2.2     FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS (AND BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION)
Functional analysis is associated with causal-role function, and very roughly refers to thedecomposing  of  a  system  into  component  parts  that  contribute  to  a  capacity  of  thecontaining  system (see  Cummins 1975).   Functional  analysis  with  respect  to  biologicalfunction entails that a system is broken down into all the components that contribute toinclusive  fitness.  This  captures  those  functions  that  are  relevant  to  the  survival  andevolution of a behaving system, i.e. functions of biological interest. I see functional analysisas the first step in the development of an adaptive explanation. I begin here for two reasons–  first  because  biological  function  likely  picks  out  more  behaviors  than  an  etiologicalaccount, and second because hypotheses of biological function occur prior to hypotheses ofselected-for function (etiological account). After I clarify the use of biological function forfunctional analysis, I will address these reasons. We can understand biological function as picking out certain features of a behavingsystem.  Specifically,  if  we  take  an  organism  and  ask  which  behaviors  are  biologicallyfunctional,  it  should pick out every behavior that has a propensity to increase inclusivefitness with respect to a particular environment, independent of whether there has beenselection for that behavior. Usually this environment would be its current environment forreasons of ecological authenticity, but one could apply biological functionality with respect
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to any environment.10 Behaviors picked out by biological function, for which there was notselection  for,  are  understandable  as  exaptations  or  the  products  of  broader  cognitivemechanisms such as learning. For instance, begging for food in domestic dogs is perhapsbiologically functional, but presumably dogs learn to beg rather than having been selectedfor begging.  In fact, every behavior that a dog gets rewarded for with food, e.g. tricks, couldperhaps be considered biologically functional depending on context. Given that biologicalfunction will pick out all behaviors that increase inclusive fitness whether they are selectedfor (as long as they are still functional),  incidentally useful, or the product of a broadermechanism,  it  is  reasonable  to  maintain  that  it  picks  out  more  behaviors  than  theetiological account.How  to  engage  in  functional  analysis  for  biological  functionality  is  a  non-trivialproblem (see especially Trestman, 2010; Weber, 2012). While I will not go into detail here,the  basic  strategy  as  outlined  by  Weber  is  as  follows.  One  begins  with  biologicalfunctionality,  and  then  looks  to  behaviors  that  contribute  to  the  containing  system’sbiological functionality at a progressively finer granularity. Functional attribution can bechecked,  by ensuring  that  each identified function coheres  with each other  and a  totalaccount of the behaving system  (Weber, 2005, also see Trestman, 2010). Take an osprey.One  starts  with  biological  functionality,  of  which  survival  contributes,  within  survivaleating is identified as contributory, within eating catching fish, and within catching fish,looking for fish, diving for fish, and grabbing fish with talons.  A scientist can conclude thatlooking for fish functions for the catching of fish, rather than, say, predator evasion, basedon their total understanding of the osprey.10 And scientists often do apply biological functionality with respect to environments other than current ones to gain traction on species that either have undergone environmental shift (e.g. humans or zebra mussels) or will undergo environmental shift (e.g. the introduction of non-local crops).
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Hypotheses of biological function are prior to hypotheses of selected-for functiondue to a circularity concern (see Griffiths, 2009).  Essentially, to argue that a behavior existsbecause it was selected for the ability to do something necessitates that one already has inmind  what  it  was  selected  for  to  do.  I  cannot  argue  squirrels  hide  nuts  because  of  aparticular selective history, without holding that at least over some period of time, hidingnuts increased the inclusive fitness of the containing system (the squirrel) such that it wasselected. However, despite the fact that a scientist must start with a hypothesis of biologicalfunction, biological function cannot explain a behavior. I will clarify.Returning to the difference between etiological accounts and causal-role accounts,not  only  do they  have different  aims,  but  they also  have subtly  different  targets.   Theetiological  account  targets  physical  objects.  It  seeks  to  explain  why  there  is  a  certainstructure or action, e.g. why there are eyelashes, and cannot target things that do not exist.In contrast, the causal-role account targets properties or roles.  It seeks to explain the roleof a behavior with respect to the capacities of its containing system and can engage withcounterfactuals, e.g. how being able to breath fire would impact the survival of canaries. 11Given this, the notion of biological function cannot explain the current physical presence ofa behavior within a system, even though it may explain (or arguably describe) the functionof a behavior. In a strict sense, accounts of behavior that do nothing more than establishthat a behavior, e.g. running from hungry lions, increases inclusive fitness, are explaining afunction not  a  behavior.12 Scientists  must necessarily  wed biological  functionality  to an
11 Another way to get at this is through the understanding of etiological accounts as backwards-looking (i.e. tied to actual history) and causal-role accounts as forward-looking (i.e. engaged with potential) (see Bigelow & Pargetter, 1987).12 Two caveats. First, simply identifying a biological function is tremendously useful as it lays the groundwork for an etiological explanation or helps to predict future evolutionary trends. Second, many scientists, for better or worse, likely assume an etiological account in the background when they identify a biological function (see Mitchell, 1989).
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etiological  account  (or  some  other  kind  of  causal  process  account,  e.g.  a  cognitivemechanism))  in  order  to  explain  the  behavior  as  a  physical  object.  Selection-forexplanations provide a way for scientists to address this difficulty.
2.3    SELECTION-FOR EXPLANATION
A selection-for explanation is an etiological account as applied to a behaving system andaims to explain the existence of a behavior. It  is the second step in the development ofadaptive  explanation.  I  contend  that  a  selection-for  explanation  is  composed  of  (1)  apresent or historical biological function, (2) a selection background (see especially Mitchell,1989), (3) specific selection pressures, and (4) quasi-independence. In practice, scientistsconcern  themselves  largely  with  (1)  and  (3),  with  (2)  and  (4)  being  assumed.13Nonetheless, I discuss all four in turn.The key move of an etiological explanation is that it makes the function of a behaviorthe reason for that behaviors existence; within evolving systems this entails that at somepoint  the  behavior  was  selected-for  because  of  its  function,  hence  my use  of  the  term
selection-for explanation. Specifically a behavior would have been selected for because of itsbiological  function,  i.e.  contribution  to  inclusive  fitness  (also  see  Griffiths,  1993),  andtherefore an etiological explanation is necessarily paired with the attribution of present orhistorical  biological  function.  This  does  not  entail  that  a  behavior  is  still  biologicallyfunctional (e.g. evolutionary mismatch, such as moths flying to artificial lighting and beingeaten  (Fullard  et.  al.,  2000)),  or  that  its  current  biological  functionality  matches  its
13 As will be made clear later in the paper, (2) can be assumed unproblematically, while (4) can often not.
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selected-for function (e.g. exaptations14, such as the success of the domestic pigeons nestingbehaviors in urban environments (Rolando et. al., 1997)).Selection-for explanations necessarily assume a selection background (see Mitchell,1989, 1995). While this can be understood at varying levels of specificity, here I would likesketch it out in the broadest possible terms.  Namely, an object of interest has a backgroundsuch that a selection process, e.g. natural selection or cultural selection, could have causedit.15 This is why the foraging behavior of squirrels is a reasonable target of selection-forexplanations, but spell-check in Microsoft Word is not. At this level, it would be extremelyunlikely any behavior of interest would not have the appropriate selection background.Note that Mitchell, drawing from Sober, 1984, further identifies selection of the target forits function as part of the selection background (ibid.). This is correct, and leads to a muchricher account. However, scientists use quasi-independence to get at this aspect of a trait’sbackground,  and  therefore  I  will  stick  with  the  broad  understanding  of  selectionbackground. Selection-for explanations also invoke the operation of specific selection pressures.As discussed, biological function does not exist as some kind of intrinsic property, but onlywith respect to particular environments. This applies even to fundamental features such as
14 Exaptation is a problematic concept for etiological accounts of function. As Gould & Vrba (1982) originally conceived it, even traits that have had their current function for an extremely long period of time, should be best conceived as exaptations rather than adaptations because their current function does not (fully) explain form. Their primary example is feathers, which likely originally served for thermoregulation, and are now involved in flying. This is problematic because at some point what is being selected-for switches and the continued existence/modification for a trait is based on its new function (also see Allen, 2009). Philosophers of science have attempted to get around this through modern history accounts of function, which look to what a trait has been selected for in recent history, if anything, to attribute etiological function (see, for instance, Godfrey-Smith 1994).15 For in-depth discussion of the kinds of populations that can support selective processes see Godfrey-Smith, 2009.
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reproduction:  having  many  offspring  may  be  extremely  biologically  functional  in  anutrient-dense  jungle,  but  counterproductive  in  a  nutrient-poor  desert,  where  limitedresources  must  be  stretched  across  these  many  offspring  leading  to  low  survivorship.These environmental features16 can be understood as selection pressures for which specificbehaviors are functional in response (i.e.  more functional than other available options).Therefore, when a scientist makes a selection-for explanation, it involves the identificationof  both  a  function  and,  at  least  implicitly,  the  corresponding  selection  pressure.17 Forexample, in accounting for the building of bowers (giant decorative nest-like structures) bybowerbirds,  Borgia  appeals  to  both  fitness  gains  for  the  Bowerbird  and  to  selectionpressure from female mate choice and visitation (1995).Quasi-independence  (Lewontin,  1978)  accounts  for  the  second  element  Mitchellidentifies in the background of etiological explanations, specifically selection of the target
for its function (1989, 1995).18 Quasi-independence entails a function of a feature within asystem has sufficient independence such that it is the function’s contribution to fitness thatled to the feature evolving (for clarification see Driscoll 2004; Brosnan 2009).  Another wayto think about this is that the feature must be a heritable evolutionary unit. This is usuallyapplied to genetic features, but cultural features work just as well. For instance, if a culturalanthropologist demonstrated that a belief in Shiva increases fitness, they would have to16 By environmental features I refer not just to the physical environment, but also to inter and intraspecific interactions.17 Plasticity can be accounted for unproblematically in this view, as the relevant selection pressures can represents a range of environmental conditions (or even something such as uncertainty itself).18 This language makes use of Sober’s distinction between selection for and selection of (1984). To clarify, selection for relates to what the selection pressure is acting on and selection of relates to what is actually being physically selected.  An illustrative example is Belyaev’s farm fox experiment. In Belyaev’s foxes, selection pressure was only applied to defensiveness around humans, but there was selection of a large number of behavioral and physiological changes such as attention seeking and floppy ears (see Trut, 1999; Trut, Plyusnina, & Oskina 2004).
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demonstrate that a belief in Shiva is sufficiently independent from a belief in Hinduism toargue that the fitness gains from a belief in Shiva explain said belief.  Otherwise, even ifHinduism plus Shiva is more fit than Hinduism without Shiva, it is Hinduism itself that isdoing the evolutionary work.To  review,  a  selection-for  explanation  explains  a  trait  just  when  there  is  (1)  apresent or historical biological function, (2) a selection background, (3) specific selectionpressures, and (4) quasi-independence.
2.4    ADAPTIVE EXPLANATION
An adaptive explanation is simply a more specific form of the selection-for explanation, andtherefore a viable way to explain the existence of a behavior.  The difference is that ratherthan  allowing  a  trait  to  be  mediated  through  any  system of  inheritance,19 an  adaptiveexplanation  further  specifies  that  a  trait  is  the  product  of  natural  selection  mediatedthrough genetic material (see Lewontin, 1978).
19 Jablonka & Lamb, 2005 identify at least four: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral (social learning), and symbolic (cultural). 
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2.5 SUMMARY
I  have  demonstrated  that  functional  accounts  give  evolutionary  behavioral  scientistsexplanatory traction on two questions of interest: first, how does a behavior contribute tosurvival (or fitness), and second, why does this behavior exist. The first question can beanswered  by  engaging  in  functional  analysis  with  biological  function  (causal  role),  i.e.detailing  all  behaviors  that  contribute  to  an  organisms  inclusive  fitness.  The  secondquestion  requires  the  incorporation  of  an  etiological  account  of  function,  of  which  Icharacterize  two  forms  --  selection-for  and  adaptive  explanations.  Selection-forexplanations explain the existence of behavior through past or present selection pressures,and contain the following: (1) a present or historical biological function, (2) a selectionbackground  (3)  specific  selection  pressures,  and  (4)  quasi-independence.  Adaptiveexplanations are selection-for explanations that further contain (5) behavior as a productof genetically mediated natural selection
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3.0 METHODOLOGY
Having now defended that the evolutionary behavioral sciences aim towards appropriateexplanations of  behavior,  the next challenge is whether the methodologies used by theevolutionary behavioral sciences allow them to arrive at these explanations. I will focus onadaptive  explanations  as  they  are  the  most  philosophically  problematic  and  entail  theability to engage in functional analysis and selection-for explanations.  I  begin by brieflyidentifying  two  broad  methodological  approaches  to  arriving  at  adaptive  explanations:backward-looking and the forward-looking or model-based approach. I then relate thesestrategies to two flavors of explanation within the evolutionary behavior sciences, how-actually  (which identifies the actual  causal  process) and how-possibly (which identifiespossible causal processes), arguing that evolutionary behavioral scientists typically aim athow-actually  explanation.   Finally,  I  detail  the connection between the forward-lookingmethodology and how-actually adaptive explanations.
3.1     TWO APPROACHES TO ADAPTIVE EXPLANATION
Having now defended that the evolutionary behavioral sciences aim towards appropriateexplanations of  behavior,  the next challenge is whether the methodologies used by the
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evolutionary behavioral sciences allow them to arrive at these explanations. I will focus onadaptive  explanations  as  they  are  the  most  philosophically  problematic  and  entail  theability to engage in functional analysis and selection-for explanations.  I  begin by brieflyidentifying  two  broad  methodological  approaches  to  arriving  at  adaptive  explanations:backward-looking and the forward-looking, or model-based approach. I then relate thesestrategies to two flavors of explanation within the evolutionary behavior sciences, how-actually  (which  identify  the  actual  causal  process)  and  how-possibly  (which  identifypossible causal processes), arguing that evolutionary behavioral scientists typically aim athow-actually  explanation.   Finally,  I  detail  the connection between the forward-lookingmethodology and how-actually adaptive explanations.In the backward-looking approach, one begins with an alleged trait and attempts toindirectly  investigate  its  history,  using  evidence  such  as  phylogenetic  distribution,homology, present day function, and genetics. While this is often difficult for behaviors dueto their plasticity and inability to fossilize, it is nonetheless accepted as viable strategy. Dueto its uncontroversial nature, in principle if not in practice, I will not discuss it further, butsee Brandon, 1990, Lorenz, 1982 pp. 71-103, and Richardson, 2007. Note that a scientistcan engage in this kind work without a functional hypothesis… this just will not get them toan adaptive explanation.  In the forward-looking approach one begins with a function, and argues that for acertain behaving system to have a behavior with that function a specific selective historymust  have  happened.  Here,  models  or  other  forms  of  inquiry  are  used  to  detect  thehypothesized function in systems of interest. For instance, Zach, 1979 hypothesized thatthere was selection pressure for optimal foraging (i.e. energetic efficiency) on the whelkforaging behavior of the Northwestern crow. Upon finding that the Northwestern crow did
25
indeed behave in accordance with his optimality model, Zach then claimed that the foragingof the Northwestern crow was a behavioral adaptation.  I appreciate that the example forthe  forward-looking  approach  is  not  very  satisfying,  but  hopefully  concerns  will  beaddressed later in this section.   These  approaches  are  not  mutually  exclusive  and  it  may  be  helpful,  or  evenrequired,  to  use  both.  If  both strategies  are  used,  one begins  with  the  forward-lookingapproach  to  constrain  the  possibilities,  and  then  switches  to  the  backward-lookingapproach to evidence a specific hypothesis. The distinction between how-actually and how-
possibly explanations helps to clarify the operation of these two approaches (Dray, 1957;Forber, 2010). I look to that distinction now.
3.2     HOW-POSSIBLY AND HOW-ACTUALLY ADAPTIVE EXPLANATION
How-actually  explanations,  in  which  the  actual  causal  process  is  articulated,  aredistinguished  from  how-possibly  explanations,  which  specify  a  possible  causal  process(Dray 1957).  Forber further distinguishes between global how-possibly accounts,  whichdesignate the possible mechanism that could lead to trait,  e.g.  selection,  and  local how-possibly accounts,  which designate the possible specific causal-history,  e.g.  selection forenergetic  efficiency  acting  on  whelk  foraging  behaviors  in  Northwestern  crows  (2010;Zach, 1979).  Given just their appeal to specific selective history, it is ambiguous whetheradaptive explanations should be understood as how-actually explanations or as local how-possibly explanations.  
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Forber  additionally  argues  that  how-actually  and  how-possibly  accounts  servefundamentally  different  methodological  roles.  How-actually  accounts  work  to  provideconfirmatory evidence to local hypotheses concerning the target system.  In contrast, how-possibly accounts start with some global realm of causal processes operating in biology andwork to narrow down the possible causal processes that could be at work in the targetsystem (2010). Based on this understanding, the backwards-looking approach is structuredas a how-actually explanation, as one attempts to bring evidence to bear on the specific,local, causal process. On the other hand, the forward-looking approach is structured as ahow-possibly  explanation,  attempting  to  constrain  the  possibilities  down  to  thehypothesized selection pressures.  However, in addition to this methodological difference, Forber also argues that how-possibly and how-actually aim at different  kinds of explanation (this is in contrast to theprevailing  opinion,  see  Forber,  2010  for  an overview).  He,  going  back  to  Dray  (1957),maintains that how-possibly explanations are intended to establish a particular process is apossible explanation (often as opposed to an impossible one), while, again, how-actuallyexplanations seek purchase on the real  causal process.   This distinction certainly holdssome of the time. For instance, Darwin’s use of thought experiments or “just-so” stories, e.g.his famous one concerning the origin of the eye, were intended to establish the possibilityof  an  evolutionary  explanation,  to  preempt  irreducible  complexity  based  “that’simpossible” challenges from creationists (see Lennox, 1991). Similarly, at the global level,Forber discusses how the neutral theory of molecular evolution (Kimura,  1968;  King &Jukes, 1969) served as a new possible explanation for certain characteristics of molecularevolution. In line with Forber’s analysis, both of these are methodologically how-possiblyexplanations,  and  both  are  explicitly  directed  towards  showing  how  a  causal-process
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(locally or globally) could be a possibility.  However,  maintaining that backward-lookingand forward-looking approaches to adaptive explanation have different explanatory aims ismore problematic.Imagine  that  scientists  engage  in  the  forward-looking  approach  simply  to  putforward  the  possibility  of  something.  Say,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  when  Zach,  1979constructed an optimality model for foraging in the Northwestern crow, and identified thatthe Northwestern crow does behave in accordance with that model,  he did not want toclaim  that  selection-pressures  for  optimal  foraging  strategies  led  to  the  Northwesterncrows behaviors, but merely put that forward as an possibility. What would this be doing?It  could  be  seen  as  a  launching  point  for  how-actually  investigation,  but  Zach  did  notproceed to do such investigation. Nor does it have any pragmatic application -- outside of acontext such as responding to irreducible complexity arguments -- therefore Zach cannotbe using this explanation only instrumentally. In short, the only way to make sense of theforward-looking approach is that even if it is methodologically a how-possibly explanation,it nonetheless usually aims at capturing the real causal process. To clarify how this may be work, think of how-possibly accounts on a continuum ofunderdetermination. On one end is a completely undetermined account in which there areno theoretical constraints on which causal processes may operating, on the other end is nounderdetermination. “No underdetermination” describes a (theoretical) situation in which,if a hypothesis that a behaving system will have a certain functional behavior is shown tobe correct, there is only one possible explanation for how that behavior came to be, andtherefore the how-possibly explanation is constrained down to an how-actually explanation.While  Forber  correctly  evaluates  this  as  methodologically  distinct  from  a  how-actuallyexplanation, the explanatory account provided is identical and known with equal certainty.
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Therefore, it appears that approaches which are formally distinguishable into how-possiblyand how-actually explanations, can nonetheless have equivalent purchase on what actuallyhappened.Outside this idealized situation, the key factor for a forward-looking adaptive explanation is then the likelihood of the assumed selective history matching the actual selective history (also see Forber 2010). If this likelihood is sufficiently high, it becomes reasonable to assume that the assumed state of reality somehow captures the real state of reality. This largely plays through as an inference to the best explanation, whereby one defends an assumed selective history, through holding that it is the best explanation of the predictive success of the forward-looking approach (i.e. successfully finding the predicted functional behavior).  
3.3 MODELS AND ADAPTIVE EXPLANATION
We can now tersely formulate the fundamental methodological challenge to the forward-looking or model-based approach as follows: does the predictive success (again, predictivesuccess entails identifying the hypothesized functional behavior in a target system) of amodel establish that the functional behavior also possesses the features that would allow itto be accounted for by an adaptive explanation. To review, these features are (1) a presentor historical biological function, (2) a selection background, (3) specific selection pressures,(4) quasi-independence, and (5) product of genetically mediated natural selection. I look to the model-based approach, specifically optimality models, to respond tothis challenge. I do so first, because such models are widely used within the ethological
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tradition forming the foundation of behavioral ecology, and second, because their formalstructure lends itself to clearer analysis. I will, however, ultimately extend my arguments toforward-looking approaches that are not based on formal modeling. To frame my analysis, Ibegin  with  a  discussion  of  the  phenotypic  gambit,  the  assumption  that  underlies  alloptimality-model based approaches in the evolutionary behavioral sciences.
3.3.1 The phenotypic gambit
Grafen (1984) formalizes the phenotypic gambit as follows: 
The phenotypic gambit is to examine the evolutionary basis of a character as if thevery simplest genetic system controlled it: as if there were a haploid locus at whicheach distinct strategy was represented by a distinct allele, as if the payoff rule gavethe number of offspring for each allele, and as if enough mutation occurred to alloweach strategy the chance to invade.
While Grafen formalized the gambit, it was used in implicitly in behavioral ecologywell  before  (e.g.  Zach,  1979).   The  phenotypic  gambit  exposed,  and  commensuratelyopened  up  for  discussion,  the  assumptions  and  structure  that  underlie  the  use  ofoptimization models and adaptive explanations in behavioral ecology. Understood in thesimplest  terms,  the phenotypic gambit is  nothing more than an assumption that  allowsscientists to offer adaptive explanations for the target of a model, without engaging in anexhaustive investigative process (Grafen, 1984). Pincock (2012), in a recent discussion ofidealization in biology, identified “gambit” idealizations in which “we sacrifice truth with
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respect  to  one  feature  with  the  aim  of  accurately  representing  some  other  features.”Clearly, all  of the above elements listed by Grafen are false, i.e.  sacrificed truth, but if  amodel  built  on  the  phenotypic  gambit  leads  to  predictive  success,  then  the  adaptiveexplanation provided is taken to be correct.Since Grafen, the phenotypic gambit has often been paraphrased in somewhat lessstructured terms: Borgerhoff Mulder’s and Schacht’s definition of, “the claim that how atrait is inherited does not seriously constrain adaptive responses to ecological variation,” isrepresentative (2012). However, what Grafen’s formalization makes clear is that optimalitymodels are nothing more than idealized adaptive explanations. This can be seen clearly bycomparing it to the account above. Optimality models definitionally represent present orhistorical  biological  functions  as  they  are  explicitly  constructed  to  identify  the  fitteststrategy  (i.e.  the  local  fitness  optimum).   They  also  obviously  assume  a  selectionbackground. The payoff rule entails that model builders are looking at success in responseto  specific  selection  pressures.  The  representation  of  each  strategy  as  a  distinct  allelecaptures quasi-independence (complete independence actually). And finally, everything isexpressly identified in genetic terms -- although a non-genetic formulization that wouldallow other selection-for explanations is quite conceivable. Godfrey-Smith has introduced an account of modeling in which the explanation usedfor a simple case, whether real or idealized, is extended to other relevantly similar cases(2006, 2009 p. 6). This helps to clarify how models built on the phenotypic gambit  couldprovide how-actually adaptive explanations; the idealization used in the structuring of themodel is relevantly similar to the actual target and its selective history. Moreover, as seen,the phenotypic gambit is explicitly designed to be similar to adaptive explanations on the
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relevant  dimensions.  However,  this  does  not  fully  clarify  the  operation  of  phenotypicgambit based models as relevant similarity is merely assumed rather than established. To  explicate  this  difficulty,  I  turn  again  to  Zach’s  (1979)  work  on  the  foragingbehavior of the Northwestern crow. This bird will search for whelks, and then drop themrepeatedly on rocks to get at the meat inside. Zach developed an optimality model showingthat,  if  the  foraging  behavior  is  adapted  for  energetic  efficiency,  then  (among  otherpredictions) Northwestern crows should prefer large whelks to small whelks, and, if  nolarge whelks are available, they should also prefer non-whelk foods to small whelks.  Uponempirical  investigation,  he  did  indeed  find  this  behavior  pattern.  From  this  predictivesuccess,  Zach  maintained  that  Northwestern  crow  foraging  is  adapted  for  energeticefficiency. However, he did not independently establish that that the characters and historyof the behavior he found in the Northwestern crow are relevantly similar to his model withrespect to all the features of an adaptive explanation. Rather, relevant similarity is assumedto have been established by nothing more than the predictive success of the model.This  provides  us  with  an  express  challenge:  can  the  predictive  success  of  anoptimality  model  also  indicate  the  target  behavior  has  the  features  of  an  adaptiveexplanation? To address this challenge it will be helpful to break down models into what Irefer to as the predictive domain and explanatory domain.
3.3.2 Predictive and explanatory domains
The phenotypic gambit, as formalized by Grafen and as most broadly construed, can detectoptimal behaviors across an incredibly wide range of phenomenon. If applied to any systemthat could reasonably fit its “as if” stipulations – that is to say, any system that sustains
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some kind of selective process20, e.g. culture, and could be at some kind of local optimum21--then the phenotypic gambit will allow for the construction of an optimization model, andthe commensurate detection of an optimal behavior.  For instance,  if   “Little Jimmy,” ananimal  loving  neighborhood  kid,  were  teaching  Northwestern  crows  to  eat  whelksoptimally, Zach’s model would have detected the behavior just the same. All behaviors thatcould be detected by an optimality model built on the phenotypic gambit, independent ofthe underlying causal process, constitute its predictive domain. That the predictive domainof a model can extend so far beyond its normal use should perhaps not be surprising – lookto the applicability of game theoretic models across both biology and economics. As thepredictive  domain  is  devoid  of  causal-process  content,  predictive  success  alone  isinsufficient to lay claim to an explanation. Pincock has argued that in order for models to support claims, we must believe thatcertain things are true of the world (2012). This entails that if the behavior identified bythe optimality model is found in the system of interest (i.e. predictive success), in order forthis to lead to an adaptive explanation, one must  already believe that a particular set ofconditions accounted for that success. This is the explanatory domain: when the reasons forwhich  a  model  is  believed  to  be  predictively  successful,  actually  are  the  reasons  (orrelevantly similar to the reasons) it is predictive successful. Multiple explanatory domainscan be  contained  within  a  predictive  domain.  For  instance,  whether  the  Northwesterncrow’s behavior is genetically inherited or learned, the phenotypic gambit could be appliedwith similar predictive success, but the behaviors would fall within different explanatorydomains.  Within  this  understanding,  selection-for  explanations  constitute  some  of  the2021 See Godfrey-Smith (2009) on Darwinian populations for an analysis of the domain in which evolutionary selective processes can apply. Also see Gintis (2007) for detailed discussion of the broad applicability of modeling techniques for behaviors.
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behaviors predicted by phenotypic gambit based optimality models, while within selection-for explanation there are narrower explanatory domains such as adaptive explanation orcultural selection.The distinction between predictive and explanatory domains can map onto adaptiveexplanations,  whereby  predictive  success  detects  biological  functionality  and  theexplanatory  domain  is  represented  by  the  other  features  of  an  adaptive  explanation.Pincock (2012) addresses this through the concept of anchoring. In order to provide anexplanation, a model must be anchored to its target system through a particular empiricallycouched  understanding  of  reality.  Specifically,  a  phenotypic  gambit  based  model  isanchored  just  when  the  features  of  a  trait  that  enabled  the  model  to  be  predictivelysuccessful are the same features that would make the trait an adaptation. Therefore, theconcern is whether the systems (organisms) to which phenotypic gambit based models areapplied  are  within  the  explanatory  domain  for  adaptive  explanations,  i.e.  whether  theexplanations provided are anchored. To get purchase on this concern, I evaluate predictivesuccess with respect to the features of an adaptive explanation for the kind of systems thatare usually targeted by behavioral ecologists.
3.3.3 Anchoring adaptive explanations
Again,  I  have characterized the features of  an adaptive explanation as (1) a present orhistorical biological function, (2) a selection background, (3) specific selection pressures,(4) quasi-independence, and (5) product of genetically mediated natural selection. Let ussee how predictive success works to anchor these features.  However,  it  is  important toremember that predictive success need not be the end for a putative adaptive explanation,
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additional sources of evidence can be brought forward for clarification, confirmation, orcontradiction.
(1) Present or Historical Biological Function: Again phenotypic gambit based models are designed specifically to detect biological functionality. Optimality models begin by first identifying what would be the (locally) optimal strategy with respect to fitness, and then searching for that strategy in a target system. Therefore, the behavior being searched is explicitly biological functional – and not just functional, optimal. It is of course possible for a scientist to misidentify what would represent an optimal strategy, but the impressive track record of optimality models indicates that at least this feature is unproblematic (see Grafen, 1984; for further discussion on the methodology behind optimality models see Maynard Smith, 1978; Orzack & Sober, 1994; Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990).(2) Selection Background: All systems of interest to those in the ethological tradition can at least support adaptive explanations, being biological with genetic systems of inheritance (see Godfrey-Smith, 2009 for discussion of the kinds of populations that support selective processes). There is the technical possibility that a biologically functional behavior arose through a non-selective system, e.g. drift or as a spandrel (see Gould & Lewontin, 1979), but it hard to imagine optimal or even functional behaviors arising simply through chance (see Dawkins, 1983, 1986; Pinker & Bloom 1992). (3) Specific Selection Pressures: As mentioned earlier, the specific selection pressures hypothesized are a legitimate theoretical concern because there will always be some measure of underdetermination. However, at least three factors can motivate trust 
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in the hypothesized selection pressures. First, the predictive success of the model helps to evidence the hypothetical selection pressures from which the optimum was derived. Second, many selection pressures are quite intuitable and involve problems that almost all organisms would face – avoiding predators, acquiring sufficient food, etc. (see Maynard Smit,h 1978; Machery, 2008; for a somewhat more tempered position see Lewontin, 1978). Third, in the ethological tradition these selective hypotheses are not coming out of nowhere, but based on a broad understanding of the behavior and life of the organism.There is the additional concern that even if the correct selection pressuresfor the behavior as it currently functions are identified, different selection pressureshave acted on it  historically,  i.e.  the  behavior is  an exaptation.  How serious  thisconcern is  depends  on  how  far  one  cares  to  look  back.22 Unless  a  scientist  hasknowledge  of  a  recent  environmental  shift,  current  behavioral  function  shouldprovide  an extremely  good guide to  what that  behavior  was  selected for  in  therecent  past.  Unfortunately,  optimality  models  do  not  screen  against  shifts  offunctions in the distant past.  However, this concern may be a little less significantfor behaviors as their plasticity makes it unlikely that similarly structured behaviorswould  be  conserved  across  vast  stretches  of  time  performing radically  differentfunctions.  Regardless,  it  at least seems reasonable that a scientist could read therecent selective history of a behavior.(4) Quasi-independence: Depending on the organism, quasi-independence can be a very serious concern. It may be helpful to think of challenges to quasi-independence at two levels. First as a sort of linkage, in which two (or some small number) of 22 For discussion on how to understand exaptations versus adaptations with respect to both the recent and distant past see Allens, 2009; Godfrey-Smith, 1994; Gould & Vrba, 1982,.
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behaviors are in some way structurally connected, e.g. antagonistic pleiotropy. This is unlikely to be a problem, as optimality should screen against it – that is, in a structurally connected system either nothing will go to optimum and therefore will not be detected, or only one component goes to an optimum and that is the component that supports the adaptive explanations. Second, however, is as subordination to broader cognitive mechanism. Fawcett et. al. (2012) identifies a 
behavioral gambit in which behaviors picked out by optimality models are assumed to be particular evolutionary units rather than merely one instance of broader cognitive mechanism such as a heuristic, or even learning23. Specifically the concern is that certain cognitive mechanisms, e.g. learning, can support multiple behaviors at local optima. And, if a behavior is merely part of a broader capacity, it cannot have the evolutionary independence needed to support an adaptive explanation unless that behavior’s function is the reason the entire cognitive mechanism was selected.How  problematic  this  is  depends  on  the  organism  being  targeted.  Forinstance,  in  organisms  with  limited  cognitive  complexity  such  as  insects  oramphibians the failure of quasi-independence may not be a concern. However, forother organisms, e.g. great apes, the organism’s own cognitive abilities may providea very compelling counter-hypothesis to selection. For such organisms, it may beadvisable  for  scientists  to  engage  in  further  study  to  discriminate  cognitivemechanism from selection. Fawcett. et.  al.  (2012) also recommend that scientistsmake  specific  forward-looking  hypotheses  aimed  to  detect  broader  cognitivemechanism,  i.e  heuristics  or  behavioral  rules  of  thumb,  rather  than just  specific
23 Not necessarily to simplify learning as unitary process, but it should be clear that learning-type mechanisms, even if a little more specific than as conceived by the behaviorists, can nonetheless contain many, many behaviors.
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behaviors  (also  see  Gigerenzer  &  Gaissmeyer,  2011).  This  is  certainly  a  viableoption,  and  may  be  important  for  future  research,  but  lacks  the  simplicity  ofphenotypic gambit based models.(5) Product of Genetically Mediated Natural Selection: Again, how problematic this assumption is depends on the organism being targeted. For many organisms, there is no system of inheritance beyond the genetic one (plus epigenetic and regulatory elements).  In these organisms, a selection-for explanation is automatically an adaptive explanation. However, other organisms of interest can also support selective processes through social learning or even culture (see Avital & Jablonka, 2000; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). In such organism, e.g. birds, it becomes an empirical question whether or not the selection process was mediated through genetics, although it often simply assumed.24 This assumption, that phenotypic observations tend to be representative of underlying genetics, is referred to as Cheverud’s conjecture. While the correlation between genotype and phenotype has been generally well evidenced for morphological traits (Cheverud, 1988; but see Hadfield et. al., 2007), the evidence is not quite so strong for behavioral traits (although see Dochtermann, 2011).
In summary, it appears that predictive success of optimality models can do a pretty goodjob of anchoring adaptive explanations. For systems of interest, (1) a present or historical
24 It is perhaps a fair criticism that scientists simply assume every selection-for explanation is an
adaptive explanation in non-human organism due the prominence of natural selection and its
paradigm status as the explanation for biological function. How problematic this is may depend
on the pragmatic goals toward which research is directed, e.g. it may not be so problematic for
research merely intended to satisfy curiosity, but tremendously problematic for research intended
to support intervention on behaviors.
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biological  function,  (2)  a  selection  background,  and  (to  a  somewhat  lesser  extent)  (3)specific  selection  pressures  are  quite  well  anchored.   (4)  quasi-independence  and  (5)product of genetically mediated natural selection are not quite so certain. They are wellanchored in less cognitively complex organisms,  which tend to support neither broadercognitive  mechanisms  underlying  multiple  behaviors  nor  non-genetic  systems  ofinheritance. However, in more cognitively complex organisms, while adaptive explanationscertainly  can  be  valid,  it  may  be  helpful  to  empirically  engage  with  cognition  and  themechanism of selection (also see Avital & Jablonka, 2000; Fawcett, et. al. 2012; Jablonka &Lamb, 2005; Owens, 2006). 
3.3.4 Beyond the phenotypic gambit
Finally, while optimality models are a particularly salient case of forward-looking adaptivehypotheses, they are by no means the only way to go about it.  One of the key advantages ofoptimality models  is  that  local  fitness optima are an incredibly powerful  way to detectbiological functionality.  However, rather than basing the construction of forward-lookinghypotheses off of optimality, which results in the construction of mathematical models, onecan also construct forward-looking hypotheses from advantageousness.   If  something is(locally) optimal, then, with respect to the model, it is as if no causes other than selectionhave  been acting.  However,  many adaptive  accounts  do not  rely  on a  trait  functioningoptimally, but rather on a trait simply being advantageous, i.e.  increasing an organism’sability to survive and/or reproduce (see Sober, 2000 pp. 78 – 83).25 In a similar manner to
25 And, in a way, this is also represents optimality models themselves. Scientists do not expect perfect fit, but merely good enough fit (see Driscoll, 2009; Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990).
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the  construction  of  optimality  models,  one  begins  with  the  hypothesizing  of  selectionpressures, and based on the assumption that an organism should respond advantageously(rather than optimally) to these pressures, generates behaviors/properties of behaviorsthat  the  organism  should  have.  The  eschewing  of  optimality  will  often  shed  themathematical dimension (although we can certainly imagine more sophisticated modelsthat can allow for constraints and imperfections), but the process is in principal the same.
3.4 SUMMARY
In this section I have argued that evolutionary behavioral scientists aim at how-actuallyexplanations of behaviors through collapsing the possible causal processes down until theyhave a good chance of having identified the actual cause process.  Using the phenotypicgambit as an exemplar of forward-looking hypothesis, I demonstrated that scientists canprovide adaptive explanations by applying optimality models to situations such that thereasons  for  predictive  success  are  very  likely  to  be  relevantly  similar  to  the  adaptiveexplanation built  into the model.  Finally,  I  argued that for many non-human organismspredictive success is a pretty good justification for an adaptive explanation, although thereare  remaining concerns  over broader cognitive  mechanism and non-genetic  systems ofinheritance in more cognitively advanced organisms.  In the next section, I turn to humans.
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4.0 ADAPTIVE EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIORS
Applying adaptive explanations to human behavior has been especially contentions (see, for example, Gray, Heaney, & Fairhall, 2003; Kitcher, 1985; Richardson, 2007). Using the features of adaptive explanations identified above, I problematize each feature with respect to human behaviors and then discuss the ways that the human evolutionary behavioral sciences have responded to these difficulties.  Of the human evolutionary behavioral sciences – most prominently human behavioral ecology (HBE), evolutionary psychology, and gene-culture coevolution -- the one most concerning with providing adaptive explanations as discussed here is evolutionary psychology, and therefore it will form the focal point of this section. HBE will occasionally be looked to for comparison, but it is explicitly not interested in adaptive explanations as described above (Borgerhoff Mulder & Schacht, 2012).26  
26 This perhaps merits some explanation, as it far from intuitive why evolutionary psychology is a good target for my paper and HBE is not. After all, HBE explicitly uses optimality models and the phenotypic gambit and therefore seems to follow much more naturally. However, HBE is largely not interested in the features of a system that explain why a prediction holds, and therefore is not a good case study for the broader purpose of this paper. For further analysis of why HBE, despite seeming to be simply a continuation of behavioral ecology, should not actually be seen as such, see Driscoll, 2009.
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4.1     OBSTACLES AND OVERCOMINGS WITH HUMAN BEHAVIORS
In line with the last section, I will simply review the approach of the human evolutionarybehavioral sciences, especially evolutionary psychology, in relation to the features of anadaptive explanation. However, rather than trying to argue that the methodology used onnon-human animals can simply be switched to humans, I will defend that specific changeshave been made which make the human evolutionary behavioral sciences more able toprovide  adaptive  explanations  for  human  behaviors.  This  should  also  help  to  providetraction on relevant similarities and differences between evolutionary psychology and theevolutionary behavioral sciences generally. Before proceeding, it should be mentioned thatevolutionary  psychology  tends  not  use  optimality  models,  instead  making  use  ofpredictions from advantageousness based forwarding-looking hypotheses. Again, the fivefeatures of an adaptive explanation are (1) a present or historical biological function, (2) aselection  background,  (3)  specific  selection  pressures,  (4)  quasi-independence,  and (5)product of genetically mediated natural selection. 
4.1.1 A present or historical biological function
A key aspect of biological function is that the functionality of target traits are linked toenvironmental context.  And while it is controversial the exact way in which humans areremoved  from  the  environment(s)  in  which  most  of  their  evolution  took  place  it  isuncontroversial that humans have undergone drastic environmental shift.  Given this, thereis little reason to expect that human behaviors within their current environment will bebiologically functional. As discussed in the second section, one can understand biological
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function as representing time-slice functions rather than current functions, i.e.  targetingwhichever period(s)/environment(s) biological function is believed to most track what abehavior  was  selected  for.  However,  to  do  this  requires  an  understanding  of  thishypothetical  past  environment  and  its  constitutive  selection  pressures.  The  specifichypothetical environment (or more accurately, a hypothetical set of selection pressures) towhich traits possess evolved functionality is referred to as the environment of evolutionaryadaptedness or EEA (Bowlby, 1969; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).The  human  behavioral  sciences  take  two  predominant  approaches  to  detectingbiological functionality across the recent environmental shift. First, they use archaeologicalaccounts and anthropological work in traditional societies and historical populations. Thisattempts  to  reconstruct  the  real  historical  environment  (or  use  relevantly  similarpopulations) and therefore pull out biological functionality. It is important that, exceptingarcheology, research can be conducted on these populations. While this strategy is usedthroughout  the  human  behavioral  sciences,  it  is  especially  characteristic  of  HBE(Borgerhoff Mulder & Schacht, 2012). In  the  second  approach,  scientists  use  knowledge  drawn  from  archeology  andhunter-gatherer studies to construct the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)(Tooby  &  Cosmides,  1992).  This  approach is  characteristic  of  evolutionary  psychology.Rather  than  identifying  a  specific  environment,  this  procedure  can  be  understood  ascoalescing a broad array of selection pressures that humans likely faced into a thoughtexperiment  that  is  useful  for  detecting  biological  functionality  (see  Tooby  & Cosmides,2005).  Tooby & Cosmides characterize their understanding of the EEA as the challengesthat would face a human living in the Pleistocene era (from 1.8 mya to 10,000 ya) (1992).While both the similarity of traditional societies to ancestral population, and the specific
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account of the EEA offered by Tooby and Cosmides have been criticized  (for discussion seeLaland  and  Brown,  2002,  and  Marlowe,  2005),  this  is  nonetheless  the  right  kind  ofapproach to detecting biological functions and likely works at least some of the time.Unlike evolutionary psychology, HBE is still largely based on the use of optimality models. This is partly because the populations human behavioral ecologists tend to study are considered representative of ancestral behaviors. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists also look at behaviors in agricultural and industrial societies and therefore do not possess a population with which to easily test the predictions of optimality models. In line with the discussion at the end of the third section, evolutionary psychologists instead hypothesize potential biological functions based on the EEA, and then use those to generate specific testable predictions within modern societies.
4.1.2 Selection Background
Again,  humans  provide  the  right  broad  selection  background  to  support  adaptiveexplanations.
4.1.3 Specific selection pressures
Specific  selection  pressures  represent  a  particular  difficulty  for  studies  on  humanbehaviors,  because there  is  no way to check against  current  biological  functionality.  Inorganisms  that  have  not  undergone  environmental  shift,  current  biological  functionprovides an important piece of evidence for selected-for biological function. Unfortunately,I see no way completely around this difficulty. Historical and hunter-gatherer societies may
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provide some insight,  but ultimately evolutionary psychologists will have to trust in theselection  pressures  used  in  their  account  of  the  EEA.  Nonetheless,  evolutionarypsychologists are still able to rely on predictive success to support hypotheses of selectionpressures, and the use of more obvious selection pressures.
4.1.4 Quasi-independence
Given that cognitive complexity generally problematizes quasi-independence (see the thirdsection),  it  unsurprising  that  this  feature  is  a  particularly  acute  difficulty  for  adaptiveexplanations of human behaviors. An individual behavior could always be part of a broaderbehavioral capacity (cognitive mechanism) underlying many behaviors, and that capacity isthe relevant evolutionary unit. In fact, part of the motivation of the original social sciencesapproach,  e.g.  the  behaviorist  approach  advocated  by  Skinner  and  Watson,  was  theprinciple  that  humans  have  a  only  few  extremely  general  cognitive  mechanisms  (andperhaps only one – learning).  While this degree of domain-generality has been soundlycritiqued (see especially Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), given the incredible diversity of humanbehaviors and the associated cognitive complexity, it remains extraordinarily difficult  toknow just how to parameterize to arrive at evolutionary units.HBE and evolutionary psychology take very different approaches to the difficultywith individuation. HBE simply does not worry if the target of interest is an evolutionaryunit, or merely part of a larger capacity. This represents a key theoretical difference frombehavioral ecology and may help to explain why evolutionary psychology has received thebrunt of criticism. Evolutionary psychology, in contrast, has much more of an interest inthis. The main theoretical move made by evolutionary psychology is to focus on cognitive
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mechanisms  rather  than  behaviors  themselves  (Tooby  &  Cosmides,  1992).  This  makestremendous sense in theory, as it is all but guaranteed that at some level there will be acognitive  mechanism,  which  is  also  an  evolutionary  unit,  underlying  a  biologicallyfunctional  behavior.  However,  as  there  is  not  direct  observational  access  to  cognitivemechanisms, evolutionary psychologists are now placed in the difficult position of havingto  infer  cognitive  mechanisms  from  behaviors.   At  least  two  strategies  are  used  toovercome this challenge: decision heuristics and modularity.For decision heuristics, rather than hypothesizing a biologically functional behavior,one hypothesizes a biologically functional role of thumb or heuristic, e.g. run from biggerorganism if they move towards you above a certain speed. If a human (or any organism forthat matter) operates under such a heuristic, then certain responses should be expected incertain situations.  This  is  essentially  identical  to hypothesizing  a biologically  functionalbehavior, except for rather than finding the behavior itself one finds a set of behaviors andinfers that a particular underlying heuristic  (i.e.  cognitive mechanism) is  operating (forfurther discussion see Gigerenzer & Gaissmeyer, 2011).Modularity is somewhat more contentious. Based on findings that possessing just afew  domain-general  cognitive  modules  does  not  actually  lead  to  behavioral  flexibility,evolutionary psychologists argued that underlying cognitive mechanisms are not sweepingall-purpose  machines,  but  instead  quite  narrowly  construed  modules   (see  Tooby  &Cosmides,  1992,  and for clarification see Machery,  2008).27 In practice,  this  means thatmany  evolutionary  psychologists  deal  with  a  specific  behavior  (or  a  limited  set  ofbehaviors/preferences) and then make a nod in the direction of an underlying cognitivemodule. 27 For further discussion see Tooby & Cosmides ,1992; Barret & Kurzban, 2006; Machery, 2007.
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While the debate is ongoing, it appears likely that this approach is appropriate atleast some of time (see Machery, 2008; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). However, there is still adifficulty. Namely, a cognitive mechanism does not have to be particularly general for thebehaviors it enables to fail quasi-independence; it only needs to support more than oneoptimal (or advantageous) behavior. Nonetheless, this is more of a caveat or precautionthan a coup de grace.
4.1.5 Product of genetically mediated natural selection
This  feature  of  adaptive  explanation  captures  the  most  notorious  challenge  –  there  isalways  culture  to  allow  for  an  alternative  selection-for  explanation.  Moreover,  simplyproviding a selection-for explanation of  human traits  is  frowned upon;  it  seen to be ofparticular  import whether a  trait  is  culturally or genetically  mediated.  There are  likelyseveral explanations for this: because many see culture a key to human identity, because oflingering fears of biological determinism, because of a greater demand to get the scienceright,  or  perhaps  because  of  real,  and  potentially  relevant,  differences  in  the  way  oneintervenes on a genetically, rather than culturally, mediated trait. Regardless, separatingthe genetically mediated from the culturally mediated is a major obstacle.HBE and evolutionary psychology again differ similarly with respect to identifyingthe selective mechanism that led to a trait. Human behavioral ecologists are uninterested inwhether a biologically functional trait was the product of genetically or cultural mediatedselection (Borgerhoff Mulder & Schacht, 2012). In contrast, evolutionary psychologists aimspecifically to identify genetically inherited traits (even if they acknowledge these traits arerealized  through  development  (Tooby  &  Cosmides,  1992)).  Evolutionary  psychologists
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have two major approaches to picking out genetically mediated behaviors. First, they lookto  “direct”  evidence  of  genetic  mediation,  specifically  cross-cultural  and  developmentalevidence (see Machery,  2008).  If  a behavior (or cognitive tendency) is present across arange of cultures it is assumed not to be caused by cultural selection, and instead by anunderlying genetic commonality.28 Similarly, if a behavior develops before cultural factorscould  have  formed  it,  it  is  understood  as  genetic  (again  look  to  Machery,  2008  forelaboration).  The  second  approach  is  an  appeal  to  design.  Specifically,  evolutionarypsychologists argue that a behavior’s cognitive architecture (i.e. the mechanism) illustratescomplex functional design, with the ancillary assumption that complex functional designcan only arise through natural selection (see Tooby & Cosmides,  2005; Pinker& Bloom,1992; also see Dawkins, 1986). The  appeal  to  complex  functional  design  again  relies  upon  the  mechanismunderlying  a  behavior  and is  a  major  difference  between evolutionary  psychology  andother evolutionary behavioral sciences.  Evolutionary behavioral scientists studying non-human  animals  tend  not  to  look  to  design  features  of  behaviors  to  make  adaptiveexplanations. This is unsurprising for two reasons. First, in non-human animals, unlike inhumans,  one can rule out cultural selection as an explanation for an observed behaviorsimply  because  most  animals  do  not  have  culture,  making  an  analysis  of  cognitivemechanism less necessary.  Second, functional design is simultaneously both a functionaland a structural feature, and the evolutionary behavioral sciences, as discussed in the firstsection,  tend not to look at the underlying structure components of behaviors.  It  is  themechanism, not the behavior itself, which is seen to illustrate structural design. However,
28 Of course, this evidence is not actually direct, but merely assumed to give very good reason to infer genetic mediation. However, the sufficiency of these criteria is not uncontroversial; see especially Gray, Heaney, & Fairhall, 2003.
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design  features  are  a  staple  element  of  adaptive  explanations  in  evolutionary  biologygenerally, i.e. adaptive explanations for morphological rather than behavioral characters.For instance, the structural matchup between hummingbird beaks and the length of thecorollas of flowers is seen as excellent evidence of co-adaptation (Ewald & Williams, 1982;Fenster, 1991; Temeles & Cress, 2003). In essence, evolutionary psychologists are foldingsome of the strategies used to make adaptive explanations for morphological features intotheir approach to behavior. How sensible it is for evolutionary psychologists to use this account for adaptiveexplanation  swings  on  two  particular  points.   The  first  concerns  whether  complexfunctional  design  in  cognitive  architecture  is  detectable.  The second is  whether  or notcomplex functional design is a good indicator of natural selection. I tackle these in turn.Regarding  the  first  concern,  despite  their  focus  on  mechanism,  evolutionarypsychologists are still  looking  at behavior – complex functional design is somehow beinginferred.  Evolutionary psychologists make this inference through what Machery (2008)refers to as design evidence, in which a cognitive mechanism that would be biologicallyfunctional in a past environment is found to be operating in the present.Design evidence is  at its most powerful when cultural selection can be explicitlyscreened out as a competing hypothesis,  i.e.  in situations of evolutionary mismatch.  Anevolutionary mismatch occurs when a trait that was functional in an ancestral environmentis deleterious or undesirable in a current environment. The corollary to this is that if anundesirable behavioral trait were being mediated through something more responsive toselection than genes, e.g. culture, it would have been extinguished. The human preferencefor  sugars  and  fats  is  the  classic  example  of  environmental  mismatch.  In  ancestralenvironments it  would have been biologically functional to prefer (uncommon) energy-
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dense foods, now it just makes us unhealthy (Cordain et. al.,  2005; Drewnowski & Rock,1995). The logic of the evolutionary mismatch approach to complex functional design goesas follows: (1) complex functional design indicates adaptation and commensurately naturalselection, (2) natural selection is far slower to respond to environmental shift than culturalselection, (3) therefore the same complex functionally designed cognitive architecture thatwould have been selected for  in  the  EEA will  still  be around,  (4)  therefore,  if  humansbehave in a manner mismatched with their current environment, but aligned with the EEA,it  indicates  complex  functional  design,  (5)  therefore  some  behavior  is  an  adaptation.Ironically, despite the great difficulty the environmental shift has imposed on the study ofhuman behavior, it may also help to screen out the causal effects of natural selection fromthe human cultural system of inheritance.29 Unfortunately though, the use of evolutionarymismatch is somewhat limited, as many biologically functional behaviors and traits may becultural  desirable,  or  even  culturally  desirable  because  they  once  were  biologicallyfunctional  (e.g. Buss’ contention that humans find certain features attractive because oftheir association with reproductive success (1998)).The general response to the second concern is that, yes, complex functional design isan excellent indicator of natural selection (again see Dawkins 1983, 1986; Pinker & Bloom,1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). However, this assumption has recently been challengedspecifically for human cognitive architecture. Ward (2011), drawing from Dupre (2001),has  argued  that  human  neural  plasticity  may  allow  for  changed  cognitive  mechanisms
29 This is not to say that culturally selected for traits are necessarily biologically functional or good for us just because cultural selection is more responsive.  There are clearly many deleterious cultural traits. However, the difference is that deleterious cultural traits, such as watching Fox News or liking Miley Cyrus, would not have served humans well in ancestral environments. 
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between current and ancestral populations, as the environments for these populations maycontain  different  developmentally  relevant  factors  which  can  induce  novel  functionaldesign  in  brain  development.  Ward  therefore  argues  that,  if  this  challenge  is  correct,evolutionary psychologists can no longer assume that complex functional design indicatesnatural selection and would have to engage in exhaustive empirical research concerningwhether the underlying cognitive mechanism of a behavior was shaped by natural selectionor novel developmentally relevant factors. However, Ward mischaracterizes the kind of challenge this may represent – at leastto  forward-looking  hypotheses.  Assuming  it  is  possible  that  the  current  humansociocultural  environment has led to the  development of  novel complex and functionalcognitive  mechanisms,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  they  would  get  confused  withbiologically  functional  mechanisms  formed  by  natural  selection.  The  novel  cognitivemechanism would simply not be detected by an account of biological functionality withrespect  to  the  EEA.   Neural  plasticity  does  represent  a  challenge  to  the  testing  ofhypotheses in evolutionary psychology, as a  real cognitive mechanism selected for the inEEA, i.e.  a cognitive mechanism hypothesized by an evolutionary psychologists that  didactually  exist,  could  have  been  obliterated  or  distorted  by  the  current  developmentalenvironment.  But  if  a  predicted  complex  functionally  designed  cognitive  mechanism  isfound in contemporary populations, there is little reason to worry about novel changes inthe developmental environment as a competing hypothesis.
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4.2     SUMMARY
To  summarize,  there  are  indeed real  obstacles  to  the  use  of  adaptive  explanations  forhuman behavior.  However,  the  human  evolutionary  behavioral  sciences,  and  especiallyevolutionary  psychology,  have  relevantly  changed  from  the  evolutionary  behavioralsciences  generally  to  accommodate  these  difficulties.  This  is  not  to  say  there  are  notenduring challenges, particularly related to the understanding of the EEA, the modularityhypothesis  and  quasi-independence,  and  establishing  that  a  behavior  was  geneticallymediated through design evidence. Nonetheless, the ability of evolutionary psychology toform adaptive explanations is on similarly sound theoretical footing to the approach usedon non-human animals.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I offered a structured clarification and tempered defense of adaptive explanations of behaviors. Broadly, I sought to balance acknowledgement of the authentic difficulties involved in providing such explanations, with the scientific tactics available to overcome these difficulties. I did so in four general steps. First, I held that behavior is different from other physical systems, but is nonetheless an appropriate object for scientific study. Second, I argued that the explanatory project of the evolutionary behavioral sciences is accountable through functional explanation (e.g. adaptive explanation). Third, I defended the methodology, illustrating how the controversial forward-looking or model-based approach within the evolutionary behavioral sciences can arrive at adaptive explanations. And finally, I looked to adaptive explanations for human behavior, maintaining that despite specific challenges, theoretical and methodological changes allow the human evolutionary behavioral sciences to provide adaptive explanations.
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